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Abstract
The article investigated farm investment behaviour among East (Hungarian and Slovenian) and West (French) European Union 
farms using individual farm accountancy panel data for the 2003-2008 period. Despite differences in farm structures, except for the 
presence of capital market imperfections evidenced in the East, farms’ investment behaviour was not substantially different. Farm gross 
investment was positively associated with real sales’ growth. In addition, it was positively associated with public investment subsidies 
which can mitigate capital market imperfections in the short-term. On the long run, the farm’s ability to successfully compete in the 
output market by selling produce and securing a sufficient cash flow for investment is crucial. 
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Introduction
There is a wealth of research on farm investment 
(e.g., Bierlen & Featherstone, 1998; Benjamin & 
Phimister, 2002; Petrick, 2004a,b; Latruffe, 2005; 
Bakucs et al., 2009; Bokusheva et al., 2009; Zynch 
& Odening, 2009; Latruffe et al., 2010; Hüttel et al., 
2010; Bojnec & Latruffe, 2011; Kallas et al., 2012). 
However, studies dealing with agriculture are generally 
limited to one country and exclude cross-country 
comparisons, except for Benjamin & Phimister (2002), 
who compared France and the United Kingdom.
Previous research provides evidence of capital 
market imperfections in Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries during transition and after accession 
to the European Union (EU) (Latruffe, 2005; Bojnec 
& Latruffe, 2011). Some papers tested the persistence 
of soft budget constraints in transition economies. 
However, soft budget constraints may also persist once 
the countries have shifted to market economies, which 
may lead to a postponed restructuring (Kornai, 2001; 
Kornai et al., 2003). Soft budget constraints may be 
more important in the agricultural sector, since farms’ 
government support is generally much higher than 
subsidies aimed for firms in the manufacturing sector.
The aim of this paper was to investigate the presence of 
soft budget constraints and credit market imperfections in 
three EU countries, a Western Old Member State (France) 
and two Eastern European New Member States (Hungary 
and Slovenia), by using an Euler equation model in a 
dynamic panel setting. The historical development and the 
evolution of farms in the EU vary by countries, not only 
between Eastern and Western Europe, but also within these 
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regions. In Eastern Europe, differentials in farm size and 
growth are caused by the initial conditions arising from 
the previous communist system and by the institutional 
and policy reforms of the 1990s, while in Western Europe 
these are due to the long-term institutional - policy factors 
and market conditions. During the communist system 
Hungarian agriculture was collectivised, the average farm 
size in this country was, and still is, among the largest in 
Europe. In Slovenia the communist collectivisation failed 
and small-scale farm structure persisted, thus the average 
farm size is among the smallest in Europe (Bojnec & 
Latruffe, 2013). In France, farm structure has developed 
under market conditions and policy support, shaped in 
particular by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
measures introduced after the Second World War (Piet et 
al., 2012). Its farms are on average larger than in Slovenia 
but smaller than in Hungary. Transition from centrally-
planned to market economy in Slovenia has strengthened 
further development of small-scale family farms, while 
in Hungary a bi-modal farm structure has emerged with 
a greater number of small-scale family farms and less 
numerous large-scale corporate farms. The proportion of 
small farms in Slovenian agriculture is much higher than 
in Hungary. Therefore, our comparative analysis includes 
three countries with different historical-institutional 
developments and different farm structures: small-scale 
farms in Slovenia, medium-sized farms in France, and bi-
modal structure with small-scale and large-scale farms in 
Hungary.
Our study contributes to the literature by examining 
the empirical aspects of investment and financial 
constraints in East-West European agricultural farms in 
three different countries, East (Hungary and Slovenia) 
and West (France). There has been some previous 
research on the issue of investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
For example Bakucs et al. (2009) and Bojnec & Latruffe 
(2011) found evidence of capital market imperfections 
in Hungary and Slovenia during transition. But no 
previous study focuses on whether such imperfections 
persist after EU accession or how these may vary 
between countries with different farming structures 
and historical-institutional development. In addition, 
no prior study compares Western and Eastern European 
countries. Our comparative paper thus seeks to fill this 
gap using micro farm-level data.
Material and methods
Methodology
We started with the model developed by Bond & 
Meghir (1994) assuming that the farm investment 
behaviour is a dynamic process which describes 
capital accumulation rates in individual periods. Thus, 
our baseline investment or adjustment costs model 
specification is defined by the following Euler equation:
                     
,
                  
 [1]
where the investment I of farm i in a particular year 
t is defined not only by sales growth S and farm 
liquidity proxied by cash flow CF in the year t-1, but 
also by farm investment in the year t-1. All variables 
are normalised by capital K. From the theoretical 
model we can derive the following hypotheses. It is 
expected that the coefficient of the lagged investment 
term α1 is positive and greater than one if the farm’s 
real discount rate is positive. The coefficient of the 
squared investment term α2 is expected to be negative 
and greater than one in absolute value, reflecting costs 
of adjustment that are increasing and convex in the size 
of investments. The sign of the coefficient of cash flow 
term α3 should be negative or not significant under the 
assumption that the farm can raise as much money as it 
desires at a given cost. A positive and significant cash-
flow coefficient is usually interpreted as an indicator 
of financial constraints. Under assumption of perfect 
competition and constant return to scale α4=0, thus a 
positive sign on the sales variable implies the presence 
of imperfect competition in the output market. 
Second, we included in the Euler equation investment 
model the quadratic term of debt (D) variable (Rizov, 
2004):
    
     
                    [2]
The specification in Eq. [2] allows testing for 
non-separability between investment and borrowing 
decisions (Bond & Meghir, 1994). The coefficient of 
the debt D variable, α5 is expected to be zero under 
perfect capital markets (α5 = 0). It may be positive and 
significant  (α5 > 0) signalling that the firm relies on 
borrowing for financing its investment, whilst if it is 
negative (α5 < 0) it can be interpreted as an indicator of 
bankruptcy costs.
Third, we included the investment subsidy as a 
controlling explanatory variable into the model derived 
in the previous steps. Thus we estimate the augmented 
investment model of the form:
    
       [3]
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Two definitions of investment subsidy are used in the 
empirical procedure, first a continuous variable (Xit), 
and second a dummy (DXit), which takes the value of 
one, if the farm has received an investment subsidy in a 
given year and zero otherwise. 
We employed the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimator developed by Arellano & Bover 
(1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998), also referred 
to as GMM-system estimator. Windmeijer (2005) 
proposed a finite sample correction that provides more 
accurate estimates of the variance of the two-step GMM 
estimator (GMM-SYS). As the t-tests based on these 
corrected standard errors are found to be more reliable, 
the paper estimates the coefficients using a finite sample 
correction. 
In addition, we imposed outlier rules by removing 
farms from econometric estimations if their investment 
capital ratio is above 99% in absolute value (as in 
Benjamin & Phimister, 2002). 
Data
Our analysis was based on French, Hungarian 
and Slovenian individual farm data. The data 
were extracted from national Farm Accountancy 
Data Network (FADN) databases, which provide 
homogenous accountancy data for farms through 
the EU. Only farms above a specific size threshold 
are included in the FADN, the threshold being two 
European Size Units (ESUs; one ESU is equivalent 
to €1,200 of gross margin). FADN implements yearly 
survey to farm businesses employing bookkeeping, 
with a rotating panel of about five years. It follows, that 
our panel datasets were unbalanced. The time span of 
the unbalanced panel dataset used for analysis was the 
five-year period 2004-2008 for Hungary and Slovenia 
and 2003-2007 for France.
Most of the variables used were directly available 
in the FADN database (EC, 2006). Gross investment is 
the FADN variable coded SE516 (‘gross investment’), 
defined as the difference between purchased and sold 
assets. The cash flow variable is the FADN variable 
coded SE526 (‘cash flow’), defined as the difference 
between the farm receipts and expenditure for the 
accounting year, not taking into account operations on 
capital and on debts and loans. The investment subsidy 
variable is the FADN variable coded SE406 (‘subsidies 
on investment’); these subsidies include subsidies on 
agricultural land, buildings, rights, forest land including 
standing timber, machinery and equipment, and 
circulating capital. The sale growth variable is proxied 
by the change in total output between two consecutive 
years; total output is the FADN variable coded SE131 
(‘total output’), defined as the total of output of crops 
and crop products, livestock and livestock products 
and other output. Debt is defined as the sum of short 
(SE490) and long term (SE495) loans. All the above 
listed variables are related to capital, which is the 
FADN variable coded SE436 (‘total assets’), including 
fixed and current assets owned by the farm.
Results and discussion
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the data 
used. Gross investment to capital was the highest for 
Hungarian farms and the lowest for Slovenian farms 
on average. The data shows disinvestments by some 
farms in Slovenia and France, but not in Hungary. Real 
sale growth to capital was the highest for French farms 
and the lowest for Slovenian farms on average. As for 
real cash flow to capital, it was the highest for French 
farms and the lowest for Hungarian farms on average. 
Similarly to real sale growth to capital, real cash flow 
to capital varied within the samples from negative to 
positive values. Real investment subsidy in period t-1 
to capital is on average similar for French, Hungarian or 
Slovenian farms. Debt is the highest in France and the 
lowest in Slovenia.
Econometric results
Our results suggest that the current farm investments 
were significantly and positively associated with the 
lagged farm investments, which is valid for each of 
the analysed countries (Table 2). The coefficient of the 
squared investment term was significantly negative for 
each of the country specific farm sectors and greater 
than one in absolute value for Slovenia, implying 
adjustment costs that were increasing and convex in 
the size of investments. Our estimations confirm the 
positive and significant association between farm gross 
investment and farm real sale growth for each country, 
implying that the investment behaviour of farms was 
driven by competitive output market conditions and the 
farm abilities to sell output and invest in such a market 
environment. These results are in line with findings of 
previous studies set in Hungary and Slovenia before the 
EU accession (Bakucs et al., 2009; Bojnec & Latruffe, 
2011). Farm gross investment was positively and 
significantly associated with cash flow for Hungary, 
confirming the presence of financial constraints. The 
results were mixed for Slovenia, the coefficient of cash 
flow was weakly significant when continuous subsidy 
variable is used, but it is insignificant when the subsidy 
dummy was employed. The significantly positive cash 
flow coefficients were largely similar to the ones obtained 
by previous studies on the financial constraints and 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics (whole period averages)
Obs Mean SD Min Max
Hungary (in €), 2004-2008
8,367 0.096 0.220 0.000 11.633
8,367 0.014 0.275 -10.784 3.593
8,367 0.253 0.230 -0.939 8.004
8,367 0.172 0.226 0.000 7.289
Xit 8,367 0.004 0.029 0.000 1.080
Slovenia (in €), 2004-2008
2,237 0.049 0.097 -0.206 1.738
2,237 0.031 0.182 -1.076 6.973
2,237 0.096 0.180 -0.360 7.036
2,237 0.028 0.066 0.000 0.912
Xit 2,237 0.004 0.022 0.000 0.371
France (in €), 2003-2007
25,782 0.076 0.174 -3.440 12.500
25,782 0.131 0.246 -12.325 9.370
25,782 0.299 0.292 -0.729 12.049
25,782 0.402 0.318 0.000 15.972
Xit 25,782 0.004 0.019 0.000 0.868
Source: Authors’ calculations based on FADN data for France, Hungary and Slovenia (EC, 2006).
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farm investment behaviour in Hungarian and Slovenian 
agriculture (Bakucs et al., 2009; Bojnec & Latruffe, 
2011). Insignificant cash flow coefficients implied 
soft budget constraints for France. The significantly 
positive coefficients of squared debt variables suggest 
that investment and financing decisions could not be 
separated in France and Slovenia. This result is similar 
to Bokusheva et al. (2009) and Zinych & Odening 
(2009) for farm investment behaviour in Russian and 
Ukrainian agriculture respectively. The insignificant 
debt variable implies perfect capital market for Hungary. 
Finally, farm gross investment is found to be positively 
and significantly associated with investment subsidies 
for each of the analysed countries. 
In summary, we investigated farmers’ investment 
behaviour in three countries using the Euler equation 
model. We found evidence of the presence of financial 
constraints in Hungary and the existence of soft budget 
constraints in France. Despite the differences in farm 
structures across the three countries, our results show 
that their investment behaviour does not differentiate 
substantially. Farm gross investment was positively 
associated with real sale growth, suggesting that farm 
investment decisions were based on market conditions 
in each of the analysed countries.
Farm gross investment was positively associated 
with investment subsidies. Public programmes to 
support farm investment with subsidies seem to be 
Table 2. Dynamic Panel Model (GMM-SYS) estimations (without outlier farms)[1]
 
Slovenia Hungary France
Sub. (Cont.) Sub. (Dum.) Sub. (Cont.) Sub. (Dum.) Sub. (Cont.) Sub. (Dum.)
0.375*** 0.395*** 0.875*** 0.938*** 0.016 0.022**
-1.684*** -1.711*** -0.005 -0.007** -0.00*** -0.002**
0.124* 0.093 0.871*** 0.926*** 0.022 0.018
0.121* 0.089 0.563*** 0.57*** 0.088*** 0.09***
0.378* 0.423** -0.029 -0.017 0.029* 0.029*
Xit 1.021*** 3.351*** 0.603***
DXit 0.023*** 0.18*** 0.01***
N 1407 1407 5911 5911 16992 16992
Constant 0.024 0.022 0.124*** 0.121*** 0.021 0.019
P. AR(2) 0.0839 0.0708 0.1377 0.319 0.9239 0.818
chi2(8) 10.382 11.96992 7.767 8.3459 11.271 11.684
P. Sarg. 0.2392 0.1526 0.4565 0.4004  0.1868 0.1658
[1]Outlier farms are farms for which the investment capital ratio was above 99% in absolute value. All explanatory variables except sub-
sidy were divided by capital. N: number of observations. ***/**/*: statistically significant, respectively, at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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successful in enhancing investment in these countries in 
the short-term. However, farms’ investment behaviour 
pertaining to investment subsidies is more cautious in 
the long-term. This implies that investment subsidies 
can mitigate some capital market imperfections such 
as interest rate volatility, but that in the long-term what 
are crucial are farm competitiveness and its ability to 
successfully compete in the output market: selling and 
gaining sufficient cash flow enable investment and 
thus ensuring competitive survival and farm growth. In 
long-term improvement of farm profitability can play 
important role vertical integration of farms in agri-
food value chain (Grau & Reig, 2015). The large state 
intervention in the agriculture of developed countries 
is well known. In the EU for example, the cost of the 
CAP, amounts to about half of the EU budget. During 
the period studied, French, Hungarian and Slovenian 
farmers could benefit from investment subsidies 
provided in the frame of the CAP. Although our paper 
does not provide evidence of soft budget constraints, it 
nevertheless highlights the role of the state in shaping 
the farming structure of the three countries studied. 
State subsidies help farms to cover their investment 
cost in the short-term, and therefore contribute to their 
survival. But by contrast to the soft budget constraints 
situation, investment subsidies in the period studied 
were not freely provided to farms: farmers needed 
to motivate their subsidy application with a detailed 
business plan, and usually obtained subsidies up to a 
specific share (generally, half) of the investment cost. 
While state subsidisation of farm investments may have 
some justification (e.g. food is crucial to a country; 
farms help maintain some economic activity in isolated 
areas; subsidies can give incentives to create positive 
environment externalities), it is nevertheless costly 
for the taxpayers. Further research could therefore 
investigate whether other less costly subsidisation 
channels are possible, such as zero interest state loans.
References
Arellano M, Bover O, 1995. Another look at the instrumental 
variable estimation of error-components models. J 
Econometrics 68 (1): 29-51. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-
4076(94)01642-D
Bakucs LZ, Fertő I, Fogarasi J, 2009. Investment and financial 
constraints in Hungarian agriculture. Econ Lett 104 (3): 
122-124. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.04.019
Benjamin C, Phimister E, 2002. Does capital market structure 
affect farm investment? A comparison using French and British 
farm-level panel data. Am J Agric Econ 84 (4)|: 1115-1129.
Bierlen R, Featherstone A, 1998. Fundamental q, cash 
flow, and investment: evidence from farm panel 
data. Rev Econ Stat 80 (3): 427-435. https://doi.
org/10.1162/003465398557663
Blundell R, Bond S, 1998. Initial conditions and moment 
restrictions in dynamic panel data models. J Econom 87 
(1): 115-143. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4076(98)000 
09-8
Bojnec Š, Latruffe L, 2011. Financing availability and 
investment decisions of Slovenian farms during the 
transition to a market economy. J Appl Econ 14 (2): 297-
317. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1514-0326(11)60016-0
Bojnec Š, Latruffe L, 2013. Farm size, agricultural subsidies 
and farm performance in Slovenia. Land Use Policy 32: 
207-217. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2012.09.016
Bokusheva, R., Bezlepkina, I. and Oude Lansink, A. 2009. 
Exploring Farm Investment Behaviour in Transition: The 
Case of Russian Agriculture. J Agr Econ 60: 436-464. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-9552.2009.00200.x
Bond S, Meghir C, 1994. Dynamic investment models and 
the firm’s financial policy. Rev Econ Stud 61 (2): 197-222. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2297978
EC, 2006. Community Committee for the Farm Accoun-
tancy Data Network (FADN) - Farm Return Data 
Definitions Accounting years 2006, 2007. European 
Commission, RI/CC 1256 rev. 4, Agriculture and Rural 
Development Directorate-General, Brussels, 10 October 
2002.
Grau JA, Reig A, 2015. Vertical integration and profitability 
of the agrifood industry in an economic crisis context. 
Span J Agr Res 13 (4): 1-14. https://doi.org/10.5424/
sjar/2015134-7487
Hüttel S, Musshoff O, Odening M, 2010. Investment 
reluctance: irreversibility or imperfect capital markets? 
Eur Rev Agr Econ 37 (1): 51-76. https://doi.org/10.1093/
erae/jbp046
Kallas Z, Serra T, Gil JM, 2012. Effects of policy instruments 
on farm investments and production decisions in the 
Spanish COP sector. Appl Econ 44 (30): 3877-3886. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2011.583220
Kornai J, 2001. Hardening the budget constraints: the 
experience of the post socialist countries. Eur Econ 
Rev 45 (9): 1573-1599. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-
2921(01)00100-3
Kornai J, Maskin E, Roland G, 2003. Understanding the soft 
budget constraint. J Econ Lit 41 (4): 1095-1136. https://
doi.org/10.1257/jel.41.4.1095
Latruffe L, 2005. The impact of credit market 
imperfections on farm investment in Poland. Post-
Communist Economies 17 (3): 350-362. https://doi.
org/10.1080/14631370500204370
Latruffe L, Davidova S, Douarin E, Gorton M, 2010. Farm 
expansion in Lithuania after accession to the EU: the 
role of CAP payments in alleviating potential credit 
constraints. Eur Asia Stud 62 (2): 351-365. https://doi.
org/10.1080/09668130903506862
Short communication: East-West European farm investment behaviour
Spanish Journal of Agricultural Research March 2017 • Volume 15 • Issue 1 • e01SC01
7
Petrick M, 2004a. A microeconometric analysis of credit 
rationing in the Polish farm sector. Eur Rev Agr Econ 31 
(1): 77-101. https://doi.org/10.1093/erae/31.1.77
Petrick M, 2004b. Farm investment, credit rationing, and 
governmentally promoted credit access in Poland: a cross-
sectional analysis. Food Policy 29 (3): 275-294. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2004.05.002
Piet L, Latruffe L, Le Mouël C, Desjeux Y, 2012. How do 
agricultural policies influence farm size inequality? The 
example of France. Eur Rev Agr Econ 39 (1): 5-28. https://
doi.org/10.1093/erae/jbr035
Rizov M, 2004. Firm investment in transition: evidence from 
Romanian manufacturing. Economics of Transition 12 (4): 
721-746. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0967-0750.2004.00200.x
Windmeijer F, 2005. A finite sample correction for the 
variance of linear efficient two-step GMM estimators. 
J Econom 126 (1): 25-51. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
jeconom.2004.02.005
Zinych N, Odening M, 2009. Capital market imperfections in 
economic transition: Empirical evidence from Ukrainian 
agriculture. Agr Econ 40 (6): 677-689. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1574-0862.2009.00407.x
